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Abstract: Nowadays an electromagnetic penetration process of electronic devices has a big significance. Processed information in electronic form could be protected in 
different ways. Very often used methods limit the levels of valuable emissions. But such methods could not always be implemented in commercial devices. A new solution 
(soft tempest) is proposed. The solution is based on TEMPEST font. The font does not possess distinctive features. This phenomenon causes that at an output of Side 
Channel Attack the possibilities of recognition of each character which appears on the reconstructed image for sources in the form of graphic lines (VGA and DVI) are limited. 
In this way the TEMPEST font protects processed data against electromagnetic penetration not only for VGA and DVI standards. The data are protected during printing them 
on laser printers too. 
 





Protection of information against electromagnetic 
penetration process is a very important challenge. To 
protect information various methods and solutions are 
used. Most popular solution is a restricted access to space 
where classified information is processed [1, 2]. However, 
electronic devices are sources of electromagnetic 
emissions. These emissions could be correlated with 
processed information. Then the data could be received in 
a non-invasive way. The non-invasive data acquisition is 
imperceptible for owner of such data [3-6]. 
The most spectacular phenomenon consists in the 
opportunity of displaying acquired data in a form that is 
comprehensible for a person. This in particular concerns 
sources of emissions in the shape of graphic lines, e.g. 
VGA or DVI standards [7-12] and laser systems of typical 
laser printers [13-16]. 
 
 
Figure 1 Influence of filtering of the electric signal on the form of text data-VGA 
standard (filter with capacity 5 nF, image resolution 1024 x 768, image 
restoration 60 Hz) 
 
Because the non-invasive data acquisition is very 
dangerous, the sources of electromagnetic emissions 
correlated with processed graphic information are the 
subject of analyses and tests. There are searched the best 
and the most effective methods which could protect 
processed information against electromagnetic penetration. 
A shielding is a very popular method which limits levels of 
electromagnetic disturbances from IT devices [2, 17]. 
Other method consists in filtering electric video signals 
Fig. 1, [18, 19]. 
 
 
Figure 2 Sang Mun fonts and effectiveness of Optical Character Recognition 
program: a) main document-Sang Mun Noise font, b) main document-Sang Mun 
Flower, c) document after operation of OCR program-scanned document from 
Fig. 2a, d) document after operation of OCR program-scanned document from 
Fig. 2b 
 
Markus Kuhn proposed a solution consisting of a 
filtering system applied on video standard of desk 
computer. Markus Kuhn's approach limits over 20%, 30%, 
40% and 50% of signal spectrum. This produces the 
desired effect. 
However, the limitation of signal spectrum causes that 
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reconstructed characters on an "eavesdropped" screen are 
illegible Fig. 1. Legibility level of information is very low. 
In this case a very important problem has to be mentioned. 
The filtering of video signal is not a solution which could 
be applied to different graphic sources of sensitive 
emissions. It is effective in case of analog standard. The 
problem is connected with the resolution of working of the 
monitor. If the resolution is changed the parameters of 
video signal are changed too. The phenomenon causes that 
one filter is not effective in all ranges of working resolution 
of monitor. 
DVI standard as a digital standard is sensitive to 
changing of electric parameters of video signal. The 
changes of the parameters cause disturbances of displayed 
picture on the screen. To protect DVI standard a method 
based on colors of a text and a background could be used 
[7, 17]. 
The shape of video signal can be formed by 
appropriate shape of computer font. Such approach is 
proposed by Sang Mun. His idea is connected with new 
fonts which have additional graphic elements (e.g. noise, 
flowers, Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b). The Arial font is the basis for 
the set of fonts. However Sang Mun's fonts are easily 
identified in the electromagnetic eavesdropping process 
(next chapter of the paper). But characters of these fonts 
are not recognized by Optical Character Recognition 
(OCR) programs (Fig. 2c and Fig. 2d). 
To prove usefulness of the new solution in the form of 
TEMPEST font a lot of tests were carried out. The level of 
protection of information against electromagnetic 
penetration was verified. A method of correlation between 
letters at Side Channel Attack (SCA) output was used. 
There are commercial fonts, which could have similar 
features as TEMPEST font. Such font is Null Pointer font 
Fig. 3, [20]. Null Pointer font is a typical computer font 
which has the characteristics of TEMPEST font. Each 
character of this font is built only from horizontal and 
vertical lines. But widths of these lines are various. The 
phenomenon allows easily identifying each character of the 
font included in reconstructed image. 
 
 
Figure 3 The letters of the Null Pointer font 
 
In the paper a new method is presented to protect the 
processed text information against electromagnetic 
penetration. The method uses soft solution based on 
TEMPEST font [21]. New idea is effective for different 
graphic sources of sensitive emissions, e.g. DVI and VGA 
video standards, different types of laser printers [16]. 
 
2 A COMPUTER TEMPEST FONT 
 
The design of safe font takes into account the features 
of the SCA for electromagnetic emissions. The SCA has 
the features of a high-pass filter: 
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′ = +                                 (1) 
 
where: x'(t)-signal x(t) at the output of the SCA, x(t)-the 
reveal emission signal at the input of the SCA, s(t) -natural 
noise and disturbances inside of the SCA. 
Therefore, in reconstructed images only vertical and 
diagonal edges of graphic shapes (in particular of letters) 
are visible. These lines correspond to impulses (a rising 
edge of impulse, a trailing edge of impulse) which decide 
about displaying of graphic shapes. Taking into account 
these features the TEMPEST font was proposed. The font 
was called Safe Symmetrical font Fig. 4. It is one of three 
collections of TEMPEST fonts (Symmetrical, 
Asymmetrical and Simple fonts). The names of these fonts 
are connected with the shapes of letters. For example letters 
of Safe Symmetrical font are built from vertical lines of the 
same thickness but different than horizontal lines. For the 
Asymmetrical Safe font the thicknesses of vertical lines are 
different. Additionally letters of Simple Safe font are built 
from vertical and horizontal lines of the same thickness. 
The fonts are characterized by different levels of legibility 
and they could be used interchangeably. I carried out a 
questionary concerning legibility of safe fonts and 
traditional fonts. The new fonts did not get very bad notes. 
Additionally the protection level against electromagnetic 
eavesdropping is compared. 
 
 
Figure 4 The characters of Symmetrical Safe font 
 
 
Figure 5 Distinctive features of letters 
 
The construction of Safe Symmetrical font is 
connected with maximizing the similarity of inter-
characters. It is possible because letters of the font do not 
have distinctive features. In such case given character 
could be recognized as other character. Such phenomenon 
can occur in case of every source of valuable emission 
which is correlated with processed graphic information, 
e.g. VGA analog standard, DVI digital standard, laser 
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printers. 
Every letter and digit of the font only includes various 
widths of vertical and horizontal lines. Some basic 
characteristics of two-element writing have been retained: 
- a narrower horizontal line is found in upper and lower 
parts of letter (for several letters the narrower line 
exists in the middle part of letter), 
- a wide vertical line is found on the left and right sides 
of a character, 
- none of the characters bear any decorative elements 
Fig. 5. 
 
For the tests of valuable emissions connected with safe 
font the TEMPEST Test System DSI-1550A was used. The 
receiver has a video output interface. The interface makes 
possible record of the valuable emissions. This is, however, 
a signal module. Therefore the reconstructed images 
include only vertical and diagonal edges of letters 
according to [2]: 
 




x t t x t
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The purpose of the design of individual letters was 
maximization of similarity between the letters. 
Simultaneously the letters should be distinguishable to 
guarantee smooth reading. 
 
 
Figure 6 Real measuring system 
 
Additionally widths of the letters of safe font should 
be comparable with widths of letters of traditional fonts. 
Then the statistical parameters numbers of letters and 
spaces per sheet of paper will be met. 
The tests were carried out in ideal measurement 
conditions (for the tests the semi-anechoic chamber was 
used, Fig. 6). 
 
3 INTER-CHARACTER CORRELATION OF COMPUTER 
FONTS  
3.1 The Input of the Side Channel Attack 
 
The inter-character correlation for individual letters 
was calculated for respective fragments of the analyzed 
image. Each fragment including one letter was compared 
with a pattern which included searched letter according to: 
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and 0 ≤ j ≤ b – 1; 0 ≤ i ≤ d – 1; b = Na/Nw row number of 
correlation image; d = Ma/Mw column number of 
correlation image; xn, m is pixel amplitudes of analyzed 
image with letters of alphabet; yn, m is pixel amplitudes of 
pattern image (single letters of alphabet); Ma is column 
number of analyzed image with characters of alphabet; Na 
is row number of analyzed image with characters of 
alphabet; Mw is column number of pattern image (single 
letters of alphabet); Nw iS row number of pattern image 
(single letters of alphabet); I is number of column of 
correlation image; m is number of column of pattern image 
(single letters of alphabet); j is number of row of 
correlation image; n is number of row of pattern image 
(simple letters of alphabet). 
 
 
Figure 7 The number of the values of inter-character correlation RZ for 
appropriate ranges of similarity on the input of the SCA 
 
Relation (3) was used both for the inter-character 
correlation calculated at SCA input and output. High RZ 
values make distinctive features of given characters partly 
disappear at SCA input. Consequently, it becomes 
impossible to visually recognize letters at SCA output and 
RZ values do not allow to correctly mark a letter in a 
location where it is found. In such case the phenomenon is 
defined by high values of Character Error Rate. 
The values of the inter-character correlation (3) are 
shown in Fig. 7. The similarity between characters of safe 
font is higher than other fonts. Therefore the safe font could 
be used to protection classified information against the 
non-invasive acquisition. Graphic forms of the values of 
correlation coefficient R for selected characters of analyzed 
fonts are shown in Fig. 8.  
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Figure 8 Graphic forms of the values of correlation coefficient R for selected characters of analyzed fonts, character "a" as a pattern image: a) Safe Symmetrical font, b) 
Arial font, c) Times New Roman font, d) Sang Mun Noise font, e) Sang Mun Flower font, f) Null Pointer font
 
Figure 9 A matrix of selected characters 
 
The selected characters created a matrix Fig. 9. The 
distribution of the selected characters in the matrix was 
random. We can notice that the values of maxima of 
correlation coefficient RZ for discordance of characters 
(discordance of pattern image and analyzed fragment of 
reconstructed image) are a little smaller than the values of 
correlation coefficient RZ for conformity of characters. Of 
course it is true only for safe font. For other fonts the 
differences are bigger. The situation makes possible to 
recognize almost each character of these fonts in a 
reconstructed image. 
 
3.2 The Output of the Side Channel Attack 
 
The usefulness of the safe font in counteracting the 
eavesdropping process was tested using visual method. In 
this case the visual method was selected because graphic 
lines of video standards and laser printer were sources of 
valuable emissions. Moreover the visual method was 
supported by coefficient of inter-character correlation and 
values of CER [22]. The values of the inter-character 
correlation were calculated according to (3). Obtained 
results are shown in Tab. 1, Tab. 2 and Tab. 3 and in Fig. 
10. The values of inter-character correlation are higher for 
TEMPEST font than for traditional fonts. The second and 
the third range of inter-character correlation include most 
values for TEMPEST font in contrast to traditional fonts, 
Sang Mun fonts and Null Pointer font. 
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Figure 10 The number of the values of the inter-character correlation for each 
range of relationship: a) analog standard, b) digital standard, c) laser printer  
 
Table 1 The number of values of the inter-character correlation for each range 
of relationship (VGA standard, reconstructed characters) 
The value of character 
correlation coefficient RZ 
Number of relationships  
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
0.0 ≤ R< 0.2 
lack relationship 0 125 126 191 132 0 
0.2 ≤ R< 0.4 
weak relationship 6 77 84 57 62 67 
0.4 ≤ R< 0.7 
moderate relationship 125 48 43 5 59 155 
0.7 ≤ R< 0.9 
rather strong relationship 114 3 0 0 0 29 
0.9 ≤ R ≤ 1.0 
very strong relationship 8 0 0 0 0 2 
Legend: 1) Symmetrical Safe font, 2) Arial font, 3) Times New Roman font, 
4) Sang Mun Noise font, 5) Sang Mun Flower font, 6) Null Pointer font 
 
Table 2 The number of values of the inter-character correlation for each range 
of relationship (DVI standard, reconstructed characters) 
The value of 
character correlation 
coefficient RZ 
Number of relationships 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
0.0 ≤ R < 0.2 0 25 43 107 57 45 
0.2 ≤ R < 0.4 36 137 152 144 130 190 
0.4 ≤ R < 0.7 199 90 58 2 66 18 
0.7 ≤ R < 0.9 18 1 0 0 0 0 
0.9 ≤ R ≤ 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The letters of TEMPEST font are characterized by 
lower level of similarity. The phenomenon has an influence 
on errors number in attempts of finding a correct letter in a 
reconstructed image. 
 
Table 3 The number of values of the inter-character correlation for each range 
of relationship (laser printer, reconstructed characters) 
The value of 
character correlation 
coefficient RZ 
Number of relationships 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
0.0 ≤ R< 0.2 0 44 46 119 62 52 
0.2 ≤ R< 0.4 29 94 107 122 86 190 
0.4 ≤ R< 0.7 166 110 97 12 105 11 
0.7 ≤ R< 0.9 58 5 3 0 0 0 
0.9 ≤ R ≤ 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
On the basis of values of inter-character correlation of 
traditional and Sung Mun fonts these fonts could not be 
considered as TEMPEST fonts. These fonts have 
additional graphic shapes which make easier the 
recognition of characters. The same phenomenon applies 
to Null Pointer font. The characters of this font are built 
from vertical and horizontal lines but widths of these lines 
are different. 
 
4 CHARACTER ERROR RATE (CER) 
 
Next tests were carried out for the traditional fonts and 
Symmetrical Safe fonts. It was dictated that the Sang Mun 
fonts cannot be used as safe fonts. Low similarity between 
characters of these fonts eliminates the solution as effective 
in electromagnetic protection of information.  
The eavesdropping process is based on the 
reconstructed images. Therefore visual method is the main 
method which is used to search information on these 
images [23-25]. However, the visual analysis is computer-
aided. In this case the correlation method based on CER is 
useful. The parameter determines the error values in the 
process of data acquisition which was used to the 
classifying of Arial, Times New Roman and Safe 
Symmetrical fonts from the viewpoint of protection of 
information. 
For the purpose of analysis the following was taken: n-
the number of all wanted letters which the reconstructed 
image includes, d-the number of letters which were 
incorrectly recognized, b-the number of letters which were 
rightly recognized, a-the number of letters which were 
unrecognized but which were wanted (a = n – b), m-the 
number of all letters which the reconstructed image 
included. Then: 
 
( )d n bd aCER
m m
+ −+
= =                                                (8) 
 
Tab. 4 includes the values of errors for tested fonts. 
 
Table 4 The values of errors (×10−3) calculated according to (8) for different 
sources of valuable emissions and for SNRDVI3, SNRVGA3, SNRPrinter3 
Character VGA standard DVI standard 1) 2) 3) 1) 2) 3) 
a 3 3 24 2 3 166 
b 1 159 91 5 5 5 
c 3 48 15 60 17 49 
e 1 12 438 60 14 378 
l 3 3 277 18 8 41 
n 112 109 817 40 17 425 
o 70 2 848 80 65 488 
p 68 3 720 46 14 421 
r 4 202 560 22 6 2 
s 3 5 254 23 3 281 
u 19 8 809 11 8 295 
y 3 3 717 6 5 249 
z 1 2 447 9 54 379 
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Table 5 The values of errors (×10−3) calculated according to (8) for different 
sources of valuable emissions and for SNRDVI3, SNRVGA3, SNRPrinter3 
Character Laser printer  1) 2) 3) 
a 5 7 280 
b 0 14 127 
c 73 24 484 
e 7 14 433 
l 143 8 5 
n 49 87 426 
o 32 51 311 
p 3 5 299 
r 34 27 3 
s 2 2 267 
u 5 14 387 
y 0 2 66 
z 5 5 358 
Legend: 1) Arial font, 2) Times New Roman font, 3) Safe Symmetrical font 
 
For the purpose of analysis, n = 31, which produces m 
= 651. Characters have been located randomly in 31 
matrices, each sized 21 × 31. Fig. 11 includes fragments of 
the reconstructed images. Certainly the quality of the 
pictures is not good [25-28]. It is caused by very weak 
signals and disturbances inside SCA [29]. However in such 
conditions characters of Arial and Times New Roman fonts 













In the paper a new computer font (TEMPEST font) 
was presented to protect processed information against the 
electromagnetic penetration. TEMPEST font was devoid 
of distinctive features in contrast to traditional fonts (Arial 
and Times New Roman). The new method was tested with 
other very popular computer fonts. There were also 
analyzed Mun's font, Null Pointer font, filtering of video 
signal and a method of colours (background and alphabet 
characters). 
In the analyses the reconstructed images from very 
weak signals were used. The images included text data 
written by traditional fonts and TEMPEST font. To 
recognize the characters of these fonts the visual method 
was used. The analyses were supported by values of inter-
character correlation and values of errors (CER). These 
parameters achieved big values for new font compared to 
traditional fonts. 
Because the Symmetrical Safe font does not have 
distinctive features its characters were not recognized. This 
makes restoring text data impossible. Values of errors 
confirm usefulness of the Safe Symmetrical font in 
counteracting the electromagnetic infiltration process. 
The filtering method of video signal is not useful in 
case of analogue VGA standard [3, 32, 33, 34, 35]. This 
standard is not sensitive to changes of signal shapes in 
contrast to DVI standard. The filtering of digital video 
signal could result in display of false pixels and even the 
screen could be switched off. Comparable effects might 
take place in the case of laser printers. 
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